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ABSTRACT 
Failure analysis of a flight control system proposed for Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) was studied using Markov Analysis (MA). It was perceived that understanding of the number of 
failure states and the probability of being in those state are of paramount importance in order to ensure safety 
flight of the UAV. Thus, in this study the number of working states and the probability of being in those states for 
the proposed UAV flight control system was accessed using Markov Analysis (MA). Specifically, the truncated 
transition state diagram of the UAV flight control system considered in this study was developed and differential 
equations associated with the transition state diagram were also generated. Laplace transformation technique was 
used to solve the differential equations. From the findings of the study, the need for design improvement was 
established. 
 




Safety analysis is an important obligation to 
demonstrate compliance with airworthiness 
requirement for airborne systems. At present, Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA), Dependence Diagram Analysis 
(DDA) and Markov Analysis (MA) are the most 
widely-used methods of probabilistic safety and 
reliability analysis for airborne system [1].  
Fault trees analysis is a backward failure searching 
technique which starts form a top event and can 
provide quantitative results such as the top event 
probability or qualitative results in the form of 
Minimum Cut Sets (MCS) via combination of identified 
causes and Boolean gates. In FTA and DDA it is 
difficult to permit for various types of failure modes 
and dependencies such as transient and intermittent 
faults, coincident- faults and standby systems with 
spares. Also an FTA is constructed to assess cause and 
probability of a single top event. When a system has 
many failure conditions, separate fault trees may need 
to be constructed for each one of them making the 
process cumbersome [2].  
In some cases, it may also be very difficult for a fault 
tree to represent the system completely. Examples of 
systems that are difficult to model using FTA or DD 
include repairable systems and systems where 
failure/repair rates are state dependent. However, 
Markov Analysis technique can be used to accurately 
model system with varied failure scenario such as 
those described above [1].Sequence dependent events 
are included naturally; therefore MA can cover a wide 
range of system behaviors [3]. Thus, in this study MA 
was used. 
MA has been used to model dynamics of large-scale 
grid systems [4]. In the study, A Markov chain model 
of a grid system was first represented in a reduced, 
compact form, which was then perturbed to produce 
alternative system execution paths and identify 
scenarios in which system performance is likely to 
degrade or anomalous behaviors occur. The authors 
further stressed that the expeditious generation of 
these scenarios allows prediction of how a larger 
system will react to failures or high stress conditions 
[4]. Farsad et al implemented a Markov channel model 
to reduce the simulation time necessary for studying 
Active Transport Molecular Communication (ATMC) 
without sacrificing accuracy [5].  
It is globally a continuous effort to design Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for special military or civil 
missions [6-7]. The main missions of interest for UAVs 
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are surveillance, detection, communication and 
deployment of war-heads. The advantages of a UAV 
include quick deployment, real-time data, low radar 
cross-section, transportable by a single operator and 
low production cost in comparison to conventional 
military or civil aircraft. Development of UAVs places 
key emphasis on data communication, on-board 
navigation, propulsion, flight control systems and 
airframe aerodynamics. This paper focuses on UAV 
flight control system. 
Chen et al studied the Probabilistic Safety Analysis of a 
Flight Control System based on Bayesian Network [8]. 
Their results revealed that the Bayesian Network 
provide a simple and intuitive measure to deal with 
the safety analysis of flight control system with multi-
state property. 
For the UAV to carry out these missions, its flight 
control system has to be inherently reliable. Little is 
known on the application of Markov Analysis 
techniques for the failure analysis of UAV’s flight 
control systems. Hence, in order to ascertain the 
reliability of a proposed UAV flight control system 
design to be adopted for the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT), Nigerian Air Force (NAF) base, 
Kaduna ABT-18 UAV project, this paper, implements 
Markov analysis as a tool for the failure analysis of the 
ABT-18 UAV flight control system. 
 
2. PROPOSED AFIT UAV FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM 
The flight control system shown in Figure 1 and 
analysed in this research work was a modified 
conventional aircraft flight control system proposed 
for the AFIT UAV project [9]. 
As may be seen from Figure 1, the control commands 
from the ground control station drive the control 
surfaces (rudder, elevator, and flap) through the 
control actuators which augment the available power 
to overcome the aerodynamic loads on the control 
surfaces. 
There are two feedback loops which draw their 
control signals from motion sensors that meets the 
requirements of the control laws. The outputs from 
the inner and outer loop controllers are summed up 
electronically and the resultant signal will control the 
aircraft through a servo actuator. The servo actuator is 
an electro mechanical device which converts low 
power electrical signals to mechanical signals at a 
power level compatible with the control commands 
from the ground station. 
Also, the inner loop of the flight control system is the 
stability augmentation system (SAS), which is an 
electro mechanical device that senses the undesirable 
motion of the aircraft and then moves the appropriate 
controls to damp out the motion. It is an automatic 
control system that has the capability of stabilizing or 
improving the stability of the UAV against any 
undesirable attitude or motion of the UAV. Therefore, 
SAS is inherently built into the airframe to augment 
the effect of undesirable motion. 
The outer loop is the autopilot; on activation, the 
autopilot automatically controls all the flight 
manoeuvers. It is usually incorporated for precision 
flight manoeuvers where the aircraft is required to fly 
under adverse conditions and also to temporally relief 
the ground control operator at the ground station of 
their duties.  
 
 
Figure 1 AFIT proposed UAV flight control system [9] 
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Figure 2 Research flowchart 
 
Figure 3 FCS Reliability Block Diagram 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Method 
The step by step approach used to achieve the 
objectives of this research work is depicted in the flow 
chart shown in Figure 2. From Figure 2, literature 
review was conducted in area beneficial to the focus of 
this work. Following an extensive literature review, 
the UAV flight control system proposed for AFIT UAV 
project [9] was converted to reliability block diagram 
(RBD).  
The RBD was then used to develop the Markov 
transition state diagram for non-repairable scenario. 
Using the Markov state transition diagram, state 
equations were developed and solved implementing 
Laplace transformation. The sum of the probability of 
all working states associated with the FCS represents 
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the reliability or the probability of working at the time 
considered in this study. 
 
3.2 Conversion of the Flight Control System to 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
The construction of the state reliability block diagram 
(RBD) for the above flight control system shown in 
Figure 3 was based on adequate analysis of the 
functional connections that exist between FCS 
components.  
The components considered are the two motion (S1 
and S2)  and air data (S3) sensors, the stability 
augmentation system (SS), the servo actuator (SA), 
autopilot (AP), ground control system (G) and the 
control actuator (CA). The two motion sensors are 
responsible for the feed loops. It gets feedback from 
the motion variables (the actual deflection state or 
position of the control surfaces) and sends the signals 
to stability augmentation system for appropriate 
action. 
The stability augmentation system (SS) and autopilot 
(AP) receives feedback signal from the motion 
sensors, one for each. Thus, the SS and AP are 
connected in series with one motion sensor. This type 
of connection indicates that the failure of the stability 
augmentation system and autopilot will result to 
operational failure of the entire FCS.  
The servo actuator main function is to sum up the 
output signals from the outer and inner loops 
respectively, and transmits same to control actuator 
so as to enable the actual deflection of the control 
surfaces. Therefore, the SS, SA, CA, G and S3 are all in 
series connection to each other because; any of these 
components failure simply implies the failure of the 
FCS. 
 
3.3 State Transition Diagram 
Using the RBD shown in Figure 3, the state transition 
diagram was developed for non-repairable scenario. 
The non-repairable scenario considered in this work 
simply implies that failure of the component or system 
was not repaired. A description of the symbols used in 
this study is shown in table 3.1 
 
Table 1 Description of Markov analysis symbols 
S/N Symbols Name Meaning 
1  State Represents system 
state 
2  Connecting 
Edge 
Connects one state to 
another 
3             λ Failure Rate Failure rate of a 
component 
The transition state diagram in this work was 
developed by implementing the steps described 
below: 
Step 1 Begin at the left of the diagram with state 
(circle) identified as JK. All components or 
equipment are operationally good at this 
state. 
Step 2 Study the consequence of failing each element 
in each of its failure modes. Group as a 
common consequence any that result in 
removing the same element from operation 
Step 3 Assign new state and identify JL, JM, JN, … , JP 
for unique consequence of step 2. 
Step 4 Connect arrow from JK to each of the new 
states and note on each arrow the failure rate 
or rates of the element or elements whose 
failure determined transition to the new state. 
Step 5  Repeat step 2, 3, and 4 for each of the new 
state failing only the elements still operational 
in that state. 
Step 6 Continue the process until the initial system is 
totally non-operational. 
Truncated MA transition diagram was implemented, 
based on the premise that a failed system does not 
necessarily mean all system components has failed. 
Thus each of the transition diagram path was 
terminated or truncated at the state in which a system 
failure can be established. 
 
3.4 State Equation 
The Markov differential state equations were 
developed by describing the probability of being in 
each system stateJK, JL, JM, … , JP at time Q +  SQ as a 
function of the state of the system at time Q. The 
number of state in the transition state diagram is 
equal to the number of state equations. The state 
equation in this work was developed adopting 
conditions stated below. 
 
Condition 1 
The probability of being in state JP where T = 1 at 
time t+ SQ. This is equal to the probability of being in 
state Sn at time t and not transitioning out during Δt. 
 
Condition 2 
The probability of being in any state JPwhere n>1 at 
time t + Δt. This is equal to the sum of the probability 
of being in all preceding states at time t and 
transitioning to JP at time SQ plus the probability of 
being in state JPat time t and transitioning out during 
Δt.. 
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Solving the state equation for a given state gives the 
probability of being in that state. In this work, Laplace 
transformation was used to solve the states 
differential equations obtained. The sum of the 
probability of all working state gives the FCS 









































































































Figure 4 Truncated FCS transition state diagram 
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3.5 Parameter Setting 
Using failure rate data contained in Non- Electronic 
Parts Reliability Data (NPRD 1991), the failure rate of 
the position sensors (S1 and S2), air data sensor 
(S3)control actuators (CA) and servo actuator (SA) of 
90.46 ×10YZ, 0.3328× 10YZ , 4.144×10YZ, and 1.29× 
10YZ respectively were used. The stability 
augmentation system (SS), autopilot (AP), and ground 
control system (G) failure rate of 1.521× 10Y[, 1× 
10Y[, and 1× 10Y\ were assumed based on the fact 
that such systems are usually very reliable. Assuming 
40 working hours a week and 50 working weeks a 
year and warranty period of five years, the total 
operational time for the FCS in five years was found to 
be 10,000hours. This time used for the probability 
computation in this work of 10,000hours was reached. 
 
4. RESULT 
4.1 State Transition Diagram 
Based on the methods described in section 3.4, the 
transition state diagram obtained is shown in Figure 4. 
From Figure 4, 47 states was reached. These forty 
seven states represent a truncated state transition 
diagram. Usually, for eight components series or 
mixed system configuration,2[(256) states are 
required. The value of the probability of being in a 
working state will not change irrespective of whether 
the truncated or a complete configuration diagram is 
used. Therefore, truncated state transition diagram 
was used in this work. Seve of the 47 states 
represented in Figure 4 represents the possible 
working state. These states are state 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10 
and 35. The sum of the probability of being in state 1, 
2, 4, 7, 9, 10 and 35 becomes the probability of the FCS 
being in a working state. 
 
4.2 State Equations and Analysis 
Using the conditions stated in section 3.4, the state 
equation for each working state (W1, W2, W4, W7, 
W9, W10, W35) shown in Figure 4 was obtained as 
depicted in equation (1)-(7).  
 
]K(Q + ∆Q) =  ]K(Q) . [1 − (`a + `bc + `dd + `dK + `dL + `dM + `db +  `eb)]SQ                                          (1) 
]L(Q + ∆Q)   = ]K(Q) . `dKSQ + ]L(Q) [1 − (`a + `bc + `dd + `dL + `dM + `db +  `eb)]SQ                   (2) 
]N(Q + ∆Q)   =  ]K(Q) . `ddSQ + ]L(Q) [1 − (`a + `dK + `bc + `dL + `dM + `db + `eb)]SQ                     (3) 
]f(Q + ∆Q)   = ]K(Q) . `bcSQ + ]L(Q) [1 − (`a + `dK + `dd + `dL + `dM + `db + `eb)]                   (4) 
]\(Q + ∆Q)   = ]K(Q) . `dLSQ + ]L(Q) [1 − (`a + `dK + `dd + `bc + `dM + `db + `eb)]SQ                      (5) 
]Kg(Q + ∆Q)  = ]L(Q) . `ddSQ + ]N(Q) . `dKSQ + ]Kg(Q) [1 − (`a + `bc + `dL + `dM +  `db +  `eb)]SQ                 (6) 
]Mh(Q + ∆Q) = ]f(Q) . `dLSQ + ]\(Q) . `bcSQ + ]Mh(Q) [1 − (`a + `dd + `dK + `dM +  `db + `eb)]SQ     (7) 
 
Implementing Laplace transformation on equation 1-7 and set the probability of being in state one (1) at time 
zero (0) as ]K(0) = 1,while the probability of being in state T where T > 1at time zero (0) as ]P(0) = 0,  then the 
probability of being in state 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10 and 35 was reached as represented in equation (8)-(14). 
]K(Q) =  i
Y(jkljmmljnoljmpljmqljmrljmnljsn)t                                                                             (8) 
]L(Q) =  i
Y(jkljmmljnoljmqljmrljmnljsn)t − iY(jkljmmljnoljmpljmqljmrljmnljsn)t                    (9) 
]N(Q) =  i
Y(jkljnoljmpljmqljmrljmnljsn)t − iY(jkljmmljnoljmpljmqljmrljmnljsn)t                                    (10) 
 ]f(Q) =  i
Y(jkljmmljmpljmqljmrljmnljsn)t − iY(jkljmmljnoljmpljmqljmrljmnljsn)t          (11) 
]\(Q) =  i
Y(jkljmmljnoljmpljmrljmnljsn)t − iY(jkljmmljnoljmpljmqljmrljmnljsn)t                                                             (12) 














− iY(jkljmmljnoljmqljmrljmnljsn)t − iY(jkljnoljmpljmqljmrljmnljsn)t                                               (13) 














− iY(jkljmmljmpljmqljmrljmnljsn)t − iY(jkljnoljmpljmmljmrljmnljsn)t                                            (14) 
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Inserting the failure rates of components and time as 
indicated in section 3.5, the probability of being in 
states 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10 and 35 was found to be 0.1625, 
0.239, 0.00002, 00001, 0.239, 0 and 0 respectively. 
Summation of these states probability values, gave the 
probability of the FCS being in a working state of 0.64. 
Based on the result obtained it is evident that the 
reliability of the proposed FCS is low, thus design 
improvement of components (extremely low failure 
rates) or adoption of a more robust system 
configuration may be beneficial in improving the 
reliability or the probability of being in a working 
state. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
In this work, failure analysis of an AFIT proposed UAV 
Flight Control System was studied. Markov Analysis 
was used to conduct the failure analysis. From the 
truncated flight control system transition state 
diagram developed a total 47 states were observed 
corresponding to 7 and 40 working and failed states 
respectively. Also, the probability of being in a 
working state was found to be 0.64. 
Based on the findings of this study, there is a need for 
design improvement to increase the reliability of the 
system. Also application of Markov analysis technique 
used in this study to other UAV sub-systems failure 
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